Minnesota Journal of Law, Science & Technology
Volume 7

Issue 1

Article 14

2005

A Proposed Solution to the Notification Problem
Ralph F. Hall

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mjlst

Recommended Citation
Ralph F. Hall, A Proposed Solution to the Notification Problem, 7 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 189 (2005).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mjlst/vol7/iss1/14

The Minnesota Journal of Law, Science & Technology is published by the
University of Minnesota Libraries Publishing.

HALL_COMMENTARY_FINAL_899.DOC

01/09/2006 12:38:43 PM

A Proposed Solution to the Notification Problem
Ralph F. Hall
I. INTRODUCTION
A hard beginning hath a good ending.
- James Howell
First, I want to acknowledge and thank the contributors
who have invested significant time and effort to this project;
their contributions have made this colloquy possible. This
commentary will build upon the contributors’ thoughts, identify
the stakeholder objectives, review the current notification
trigger proposals, and advance a new solution.
At its core, this is a debate about information. It is a
debate over how information about device malfunctions should
be gathered and when and how that information should be
disseminated.
There is manifest dissatisfaction with the
current criteria for triggering a device malfunction notification.
The colloquy contributors have demonstrated the complexity
and multidisciplinary nature of these challenges, the strong
need for a solution, and the absence of any simple solution.
These challenges exist within a complex, congressionally
mandated regulatory structure which must be honored. Any
solution must combine legal and regulatory requirements,
scientific, medical, and clinical considerations, statistical and
analytical tools, communication expertise, and public policy.
This commentary shall concentrate on the legal, regulatory,
and public policy aspects of this problem with particular
emphasis on the notification trigger issue.
The overall approach is to use, whenever possible, existing
systems and regulatory structures. Generally, the analysis will
be at the policy level.
Specific implementation details,
particularly technical matters, can be addressed after there is
general agreement on the core policy issues. Once there is
agreement on policy, the details, while important and complex,
can be resolved.
189
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II. ANY PROPOSAL MUST ADDRESS STAKEHOLDER
OBJECTIVES AND SATSIFY PUBLIC POLICY
CONSIDERATIONS
If you don’t know where you’re going, you might not get there.
- Yogi Berra
A. THE STAKEHOLDER OBJECTIVES
This colloquy has identified five core objectives: (1) protect
and advance public health through both the dissemination of
relevant device malfunction information and the promotion of
lifesaving technologies such as implanted cardiac defibrillators
(ICDs), (2) create and maintain trust among all the
stakeholders, (3) maintain the primary role and responsibility
of the physician for patient care, (4) maintain the integrity of
the regulatory system, and (5) provide certainty for all
stakeholders. These stakeholder objectives must both frame
any proposed solutions and provide a yardstick against which
proposals are to be measured.
1. Advance Public Health
The overarching objective is to advance public health. This
requires appropriate dissemination of device malfunction
information and the appropriate use of lifesaving devices.1
Three facts must be kept in mind in this quest to advance
public health.
First, devices such as ICDs have saved
thousands of lives.2 Second, a malfunctioning device can have
fatal effects. Third, the lack of a device has killed innumerably
more people than all defective devices combined.
2. Establish Trust
Patients literally trust their lives to ICDs and, therefore,
must have trust in the manufacturer and the regulatory

1. See Heart Rhythm Society & FDA, Proceedings Document from the
Policy Conference on Pacemaker and ICD Performance 2 (Sept. 16, 2005)
[hereinafter
Proceedings],
available
at
http://www.hrsonline.org/advocacyDocs/HRS-device_conference.pdf.
2. See, e.g., Michael R. Bristow et al., Cardiac-Resynchronization
Therapy with or Without an Implantable Defibrillator in Advanced Chronic
Heart Failure, 350 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2140 (2004); Arthur J. Moss et al.,
Prophylactic Implantation of a Defibrillator in Patients with Myocardial
Infarction and Reduced Ejection Fraction, 346 NEW ENG. J. MED. 877 (2002).
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Trust starts with communicating realistic
system.3
expectations to the patient, including the fact that any device
or medical procedure presents certain unavoidable risks. Trust
also requires transparency, and that involves providing
information even if the information may not be actionable or
required. In the past, the patient often simply deferred
decisions to the physician. Today, many patients play an active
role in health care decisions and want, need, and have direct
access to health care information.
3. Maintain the Role of the Physician
The physician has historically had the primary
responsibility for the patients’ medical care.
Physicians,
generally with the support of other stakeholders, feel the need
to maintain that relationship. As such, any solution should not
intrude into or replace the patient-physician relationship.
Given this relationship, physicians generally want to be the
first person to inform the patient of device issues.
4. Ensure Regulatory Integrity
FDA must maintain the integrity of the regulatory system.
This is its statutory responsibility.4 Industry has a parallel
interest. For competitive reasons, industry wants a level
playing field; this requires the consistent and predictable
application of regulatory requirements.
5. Provide Certainty
Stakeholders in general and industry in particular want
clearly defined rules. Otherwise, everyone faces post facto
judging and public criticism. If the rules are clear and objective
then companies will simply comply. In this context, certainty
allows everyone to know when a safety alert will be triggered.
B. CONGRESS HAS ADDRESSED THIS POLICY ISSUE
The question of what should trigger a product notification
is obviously a policy question. Congress is often the arbiter of
3. See Dianne M. Bartels, Disclosing Risks of New Technologies: Ethical
Challenges for Physicians, Patients, and Companies, 7 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH.
183 (2005); Lisa Salberg, Heart Rythm [sic] Society and the FDA Hold Policy
Conference on Pacemaker and ICD Performance, HEART LINK ONLINE, Oct. 7,
2005, www.enewsbuilder.net/hypertrophic/e_article000468321.cfm?x=b11,0,w.
4. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-397 (2000).
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such policy questions, and Congress has spoken on this issue.
Subsections (a) and (e) of 21 U.S.C. § 360h describe in detail
the criteria by which FDA should mandate either a notification
to physicians or an actual device recall.
Under § 360h(a), FDA can mandate a product notification
if a product “presents an unreasonable risk of substantial
harm” and a physician notification is “necessary to eliminate
the unreasonable risk of such harm.”5 Similarly, FDA can
mandate a recall under § 360h(e) if there is “a reasonable
probability that a device . . . would cause serious, adverse
health consequences or death.”6
Manufacturers also have the opportunity to provide
product notification through voluntary recalls. Under 21
C.F.R. § 7.40, manufacturers perform such recalls in order to
“carry out their responsibility to protect the public health and
well-being from products that present a risk of injury or gross
deception or are otherwise defective.”7
Congress has an established policy that a physician
notification of a device malfunction should occur based upon
risk and probability. This same policy should apply whether
FDA mandates a notification under § 360h or the manufacturer
conducts a “voluntary” recall. In one case, FDA can mandate
the notification, in the other, FDA can bring an enforcement
action for the failure to notify.8 In either case, the patient need
is the same and there should be no meaningful legal or policy
difference between these two paths to a physician notification.
I am not writing on a blank slate. Congress has spoken on
this issue and that policy determination must shape any
proposals to address malfunction notification issues. After
identifying the key issue with the current system, I will
propose improvements to the device notification system that
will satisfy these objectives.
III. WHAT IS WRONG WITH THE SYSTEM
Where’s the Beef?
- Wendy’s television commercial

5.
6.
7.
8.

21 U.S.C. § 360h(a).
21 U.S.C. § 360h(e).
21 C.F.R. § 7.40 (2005).
See 21 U.S.C. § 331.
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While there is agreement that the malfunction notification
system must change, there is no consensus on where the
system has failed. Someone has objected to every part of the
process. A close examination, however, demonstrates that the
decision as to whether to trigger a safety alert is the key issue.
For example, in the Prizm 2 situation,9 the event reporting and
analysis process worked, and in 2005 the situation was
presented for management decision whether to commence a
physician notification.10 It was that initial decision not to
notify physicians that started the controversy.11
There is little or no data that suggests that the current
event reporting and analysis system is the main problem. If
there is a major gap in the event reporting and analysis
process, then there must be some significant number of
unknown device malfunction issues lurking out there. While
one does not know what one does not know, there have been
relatively few situations when years have passed during which
devices malfunctioned without reports being made to the
manufacturer or FDA. While these processes can and should
be strengthened, that will not solve the problem.
Other commentators have identified weaknesses in the
communication process. However, the fact is that once a safety
alert decision has been made, information has gotten to the
vast majority of physicians and patients in a relatively prompt
fashion. Can the communications be made faster? Of course.
Can the communications be more understandable? Of course.
Was the Prizm 2 controversy the result of garbled
communications? Of course not.
While I will address various aspects of the overall
notification system, starting with the event reporting and
analysis process, I will focus on the key trigger question.

9. See Robert Steinbrook, The Controversy over Guidant’s Implantable
Defibrillators, 353 NEW ENG. J. MED. 221, 221-22 (2005); see also Ralph F.
Hall, To Recall or Not to Recall, That Is the Question: The Current Controversy
over Medical Device Recalls, 7 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 161, 161-62 (2005).
10. Steinbrook, supra note 9, at 222; Barry Meier, Maker of Heart Device
Kept Flaw from Doctors, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 2005, at A1.
11. Guidant subsequently did commence a physician notification. See
Hall, supra note 9, at 163.
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IV. EVENT REPORTING AND ANALYSIS
The Plural of Anecdote Is Not Evidence
- Scott Ratzan12
The fundamental purpose of the event reporting and
analysis process is to identify device malfunction trends. These
trends or issues are then presented to a decisionmaker,
generally the manufacturer, to decide whether a product safety
alert is needed.
Device performance data can come from two basic sources:
(1) field experience and events, and (2) in-house investigations,
bench testing, and analysis.
A. FIELD EVENT REPORTING
Field performance data can be collected by two
fundamental methods: (1) a “passive” system in which
individual events are reported by a physician, and (2) an
“active” surveillance or registry system that proactively collects
data.
Passive systems, such as the Medical Device Reporting
First,
(MDR) system,13 pose a number of limitations.
underreporting is a recognized problem.14 Particularly for low
frequency events, every report is critical. There is a consensus
that physicians need to improve reporting rates and
completeness.15 Second, passive systems provide only a raw
number of events and not the incident rate; therefore, such a
system may not provide a valid basis for medical decisions.16
Without more information, mere reports of some field event
may or may not mean something.
Paradoxically, another major weakness of the MDR system
is that the system gets flooded with too many (generally

12. Scott Ratzan, The Plural of Anecdote Is Not Evidence, 7 J. HEALTH
COMMC’NS 169 (2002).
13. See 21 C.F.R. pt. 803 (2005) (outlining MDR requirements).
14. See Steinbrook, supra note 9, at 223; Proceedings, supra note 1, at 5.
15. Bruce L. Wilkoff, ICDs: Dealing with Less Than Perfect, 16 J.
CARDIOVASCULAR ELECTROPHYSIOLOGY 796, 796-97 (2005).
16. See Mark Carlson, The Twin Pillars—Knowledge and Trust , 7 MINN.
J.L. SCI. & TECH. 177, 178 (2005); Robert G. Hauser & Barry J. Maron,
Lessons from the Failure and Recall of an Implantable CardioverterDefibrillator, 112 CIRCULATION 2040, 2041-42 (2005).
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unimportant) reports. In 2004, FDA received over 180,000
MDR reports, including several Prizm 2 reports.17 Most MDR
reports reflect known issues or adverse effects. Key data
regarding new issues can get lost in this sea of irrelevant
information. The lack of common terminology, staff shortages,
and inconsistent reporting also add to the analytical
challenges.
Eventually, MDR reports are entered into the publicly
available Manufacturer and User Facility Device Experience
(MAUDE) database. There are justifiable frustrations and
complaints with the MAUDE database. The data is often
incomplete, incorrect, or out-of-date.18 The biggest weakness
may well be the difficulty in using the MAUDE database to
identify or analyze product malfunction trends or patterns.
The system can be enhanced by improved physician reporting
using common terminology and, to a lesser extent,
manufacturer performance. Timeliness and accessibility are
likewise data management challenges.
The other key data source is active surveillance systems or
device registries. Some registries do not include “denominator”
data (total device population or usage) and thus actual incident
rates cannot be determined. Active surveillance systems must
include large numbers of patients in order to have the
statistical power to identify a low frequency event. This is a
practical limitation on the current usefulness of such systems.
Active surveillance systems can be time-consuming and
expensive and so may not be practical in many situations.
Some new approaches, such as using health insurance claims to
identify device malfunctions, offer new avenues for data
collection.
B. MANUFACTURER DEVICE ANALYSIS RESPONSIBILITY
The manufacturer has the obligation to investigate any
alleged device malfunction or event trends.19 This process can
include bench testing, failure analysis, analysis of returned
devices, review of clinical information, trending, and statistical
analysis.20 These investigations are a key step in converting

17. See Proceedings, supra note 1, at 3.
18. See Salberg, supra note 3.
19. See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. § 820.100 (2005) (describing the Corrective and
Preventive Action requirements).
20. The specifics of these processes are beyond the scope of this colloquy.
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isolated data points, such as a field report, into product trends,
event frequencies, root causes, and corrective actions.
The fact that the manufacturer generally performs failure
analysis and trending strikes some as a conflict of interest. If
safety alerts are bad for the company, then will the
manufacturer be less diligent in investigations and less willing
to trigger a safety alert?
Some have suggested using
independent third parties to perform this task. However, for at
least the foreseeable future, only the manufacturer can have
the knowledge, equipment, personnel, or systems to fulfill this
responsibility. Moreover, current regulations clearly place this
responsibility on the manufacturer.21 FDA routinely inspects a
manufacturer’s Corrective and Preventive Action (CAPA)
system, complaint handling, and MDR systems to ensure
compliance.22
In the end, information from all sources, internal and
external, active and passive, must be combined to identify
issues, determine ongoing investigation needs, and provide
valid information to decisionmakers.
C. THE DEFINITION OF MALFUNCTION MUST INCLUDE ALL
CLINICALLY SIGNIFICANT EVENTS AND BE CONSISTENT WITH THE
REMAINDER OF THE DEVICE REGULATORY SYSTEM.
Through this debate and this colloquy, commentators have
generally discussed “device malfunctions” without any specific
definition.23 Surveillance systems are intended to collect
information about device malfunctions. Everyone recognizes,
however, that not all adverse device events are created equal.
Some are life-threatening while others are simply
inconveniences.
The malfunction definition must be clinically relevant and
uniform across companies and device types. Rather than
reinvent the wheel and create additional layers of complexity
and confusion, I suggest using a preexisting and well-known (at
Other groups, such as the Guidant Task Force, are working on enhancing
these systems. See Press Release, Guidant, Guidant Independent Panel
Recruited,
Begins
Deliberations
(Aug.
29,
2005),
www.guidant.com/news/500/web_release/nr_000573.shtml.
21. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 360j(f) (2000); 21 C.F.R. § 820.100 (2005).
22. See,
e.g.,
FDA,
Quality
System
Inspections
Technique,
www.fda.gov/cdrh/comp/qsitpage.html (last updated Sept. 3, 2002) (specifying
the process for inspections of these systems).
23. See Hauser & Maron, supra note 16, at 2042.

HALL_COMMENTARY_FINAL_899.DOCINAL

2005]

A PROPOSED SOLUTION

01/09/2006 12:38:43 PM

197

least to manufacturers) definition—the definition of a
reportable event from the MDR regulations. The existing MDR
regulations define reportable events as deaths, serious injuries,
or device malfunctions that may lead to death or serious
injury.24 Clinically irrelevant events should be filtered out
through the application of this definition.
While not perfect, this definition is uniform, well-known,
and designed to capture all clinically relevant events.25 This
definition can even take into account normal end-of-life
replacements of battery-operated devices.26 In addition, by
using this definition, the internal CAPA processes, the MDR
system, and the MAUDE database are tied together with the
device malfunction notification process. This allows for easier
analysis, clearer communication, and fewer different systems.27
If the MDR definition gets updated in the future, that new
definition would simply roll into these other processes.
D. CONCLUSION
The surveillance and analysis systems can and should
continuously be improved. These efforts should be led from the
scientific, engineering, medical, and clinical community with
support from the legal and regulatory functions. A number of
efforts are underway to do just that. For example, the Heart
Rhythm Society (HRS) and the Guidant Independent Task
Force are addressing certain of these issues. FDA and others
24. The MDR regulations define “malfunction” as follows: “Malfunction
means the failure of a device to meet its performance specifications or
otherwise perform as intended. Performance specifications include all claims
made in the labeling for the device.” 21 C.F.R. § 803.3(n) (2005). “Serious
injury” is defined as an injury or illness that: “(i) Is life-threatening, (ii)
Results in permanent impairment of a body function or permanent damage to
a body structure; or (iii) Necessitates medical or surgical intervention to
preclude permanent impairment of a body function or permanent damage to a
body structure.” 21 C.F.R. § 803.3 (bb)(1) (2005).
25. Another option would be to use the definition of a “serious, adverse
health consequence” in 21 C.F.R. § 810.2(i) (2005). This definition, however, is
less well-known than the MDR definition and could be interpreted to exclude
events otherwise included in the MDR definition. For example, “injuries that
are nonlife-threatening and that are temporary and reasonably reversible” are
excluded from the definition of “serious, adverse health consequence.” See id.
26. See 21 C.F.R. § 803.3(i) (defining expected life).
27. There are certain aspects of the MDR regulations that are not
relevant for notification purposes. For example, the obligation to report events
before investigation is complete is important for MDR reporting but not
particularly relevant for malfunction notification. Overall, however, the MDR
reporting structure works well for notification purposes.
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are exploring new ways to access data from health insurance
claims databases. While many issues still remain open,
including who pays for these changes, these improvement
efforts should be encouraged, coordinated, and supported.
To improve the surveillance and analysis systems, key
recommendations include:
 Improve the rate of physician reporting of device
malfunctions;
 Include complete information in individual event
reports;
 Filter reports of known issues so that truly new
events are more visible;
 Increase rates of physicians returning devices for
evaluation and interrogating devices;
 Improve
the
robustness,
timeliness,
and
accessibility of the MAUDE database;
 Use common terminology and coding;
 Improve registries and active surveillance
systems;
 Use health claims databases for event detection;
and
 Ensure ongoing FDA oversight of manufacturers’
compliance with event reporting and analysis
requirements.
As the surveillance systems improve, more low and ultralow frequency events will be found. As such, the decision on
what triggers a physician notification will only become more
important.
V. A NEW APPROACH IS NEEDED AS THE PROPOSED
NOTIFICATION TRIGGERS DO NOT SATISFY
STAKEHOLDER OBJECTIVES
There is always an easy answer to every human problem –
neat, plausible and wrong.
- Mencken’s Law
As previously stated, the key question is under what
circumstances should a manufacturer notify physicians of
device malfunctions. Answer this question correctly and the
physicians and patients needs are met, and industry has the
certainty it seeks. Any viable trigger must satisfy four criteria:
(1) it must be objective, (2) it must be clinically relevant, (3) it

HALL_COMMENTARY_FINAL_899.DOCINAL

2005]

01/09/2006 12:38:43 PM

A PROPOSED SOLUTION

199

must be consistent with FDA’s statutory and regulatory
structure, and (4) it must be applicable to all medical devices.
A. THE CRITERIA FOR TRIGGERING A PRODUCT SAFETY ALERT
MUST BE LINKED TO PHYSICIANS’ NEEDS
Physicians need information that will assist them in
providing patient care.
This includes new information
regarding previously unknown or unanticipated device
malfunctions.28
The physician should be charged with knowing the content
of the device labeling at the time of the implant and the device
performance information that is otherwise already publicly
available. Flooding the physician with redundant information
adds no benefit and risks important new information being lost
or ignored.29 Consensus on this point is critical as it drives the
solution.
Physicians need information that modifies or changes the
previously assessed risk/benefit ratio, reduces the risk of a
malfunction, or modifies how to detect or mitigate the effects of
a malfunction in devices currently in use. Physicians also need
actual information, not simply individual event reports or
masses of unanalyzed data.
There is risk in providing “too much” or inappropriate
information. Unwise product notices can trigger inappropriate
medical decisions, lead to patient anxiety, and mask other,
more important issues.
As Dr. Bruce Wilkoff stated in
reference to a particular ICD recall: “I am certain that many
more people have been harmed than helped by our collective
response and will even die instead of being alive due to the
removal and replacement of these devices.”30 Other reports
exist of unfortunate medical intervention (sometimes at the
insistence of the patient) due to device notifications. One
physician has reported that “while Accufix . . . active-fixation
pacing leads were prone to fracture, more people were harmed
by extracting normally functioning leads then were harmed by
the retention wire fracture itself.”31 A New York Times article
describes a patient who decided to have a device explanted and

28. See Carlson, supra note 16, at 177.
29. See Proceedings, supra note 1, at 18.
30. Wilkoff, supra note 15, at 796.
31. William H. Maisel, Physician Management of Pacemaker and
Implantable Cardioverter Defibrillator Advisories, 27 PACE 437, 441 (2004).
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replaced because of press reports regarding a series of product
recalls.32 Of course this is ultimately the patient’s decision.
However, public pronouncements can certainly (and sometimes
inappropriately) influence these decisions.
Likewise, inappropriate notifications undermine the
agreed objective of encouraging appropriate device usage.
Continual exposure to minor product notifications that do not
involve any real-life patient risk can dissuade physicians and
patients from using lifesaving device therapies.
It is always easy to say more data should be given.
However, the risks of excessive notification must be recognized
and addressed. It is this concern that renders the trigger issue
so complex. The right balance between over- and under–
notification must be struck.
B. THE CURRENT PROPOSED APPROACHES FAIL TO MEET
PHYSICIANS’ NEEDS
Five approaches to the trigger question have been
advanced.
Option 1: Notify Physicians of Every Device Malfunction
The first approach is to simply inform the physician of
every event even if it involves a known issue.33 In one sense,
the current MDR and MAUDE systems start to do just this.
Under the MDR system, any death, serious injury, or
malfunction that could result in a death or serious injury
related to the device is to be reported to FDA.34 At some point,
MDR reports become publicly available to physicians via the
online MAUDE database.
But the physician needs information, not simply raw data.
In order to transform this raw event data into actionable
information, each physician would need to continually review
data from multiple sources including the MAUDE database,
conduct ongoing analyses of possible trends, perform additional
investigations, and then derive some consistent, medically
relevant conclusion.
Logic and recent events, however,

32. See Barry Meier, Repeated Defect in Heart Devices Exposes a History
of Problems, N.Y. TIMES, October 20, 2005, at A1.
33. See William H. Maisel, Safety Issues Involving Medical Devices:
Implications of Recent Implantable Cardioverter-Defibrillator Malfunctions,
294 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 955, 956 (2005).
34. See 21 C.F.R. § 803.30 (2005).
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demonstrate that this is not realistic. 35
The weaknesses in this approach are easily seen in the
Prizm 2 situation. According to public reports, all of the Prizm
2 incidents were reported to FDA via the MDR process and
some of the event reports were on the MAUDE database when
that controversy erupted.36 Despite these public filings, doctors
and FDA were honestly surprised by the Prizm 2 situation.
Simply having the Prizm 2 MDR reports available to each
physician was pointless. Any potential patient harm caused by
excessive or inappropriate communication is maximized by this
approach.
This approach is also inconsistent with the risk/benefit and
probability-based criteria for FDA-mandated notifications in 21
U.S.C. §360h. Overall, this approach fails to satisfy the
stakeholders’ objectives and so should not be implemented.
Option 2: Establish a Trigger Based on a Specific Number of
Device Malfunctions
Under this approach, FDA would simply establish a
specific number of events and whenever that number is hit, a
product alert would be sent out. For example, a product alert
could be required whenever ten events of one type have
occurred.
The first question is whether society will require a safety
alert when just one malfunction occurs regardless of the total
device population or event rate. In other words, is it acceptable
as a policy matter that a certain number of malfunctions occur
before there is a physician notification? The first possible
answer is a flat no—if there is a single event it must be
communicated. This is simply Option 1 discussed and rejected
above. The second possible answer is yes, there is some
number of events, regardless of incident rate, that should
trigger a product alert.
The reality is that the media, lawyers, and Congress often
get excited about the raw number of events. It makes for
35. Placing this responsibility on each individual physician actually
increases the liability risks of the physician. For example, a physician could
well be criticized for failing to identify some trend from the mass of individual
case reports sent to the physician or available via MAUDE. Similarly,
questions can easily arise if physicians come to different conclusions about
risks and patient care.
36. This fact did not prevent Guidant from being subject to extensive
criticism. See Hauser & Maron, supra note 16, at 2040-41.
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sensational press and often has a predictable emotional impact.
However, emotional reactions and sensational press should not
drive policy. A raw number can be incredibly misleading. Ten
malfunctions out of 100 devices is a critical issue. Ten events
out of 1,000,000 devices is a very different thing.
Using a raw event number as the trigger flies in the face of
FDA’s overall regulatory policies. It is illogical to suddenly
shift policy when evaluating post-approval device events. FDA
explicitly considers probability of benefit and harm when
determining whether to approve a Premarket Approval
application (PMA). For example, when considering a PMA,
FDA weighs “the probable benefit to health from the use of the
device weighed against any probable injury or illness.”37 This
and similar provisions38 clearly demonstrate that FDA uses
(and must use) a risk/benefit calculation in device approval
decisions and explicitly considers the probable injury or illness.
The raw number of events provides only a numerator and is not
capable of providing the probability of injury or illness.
Product labeling generally provides event frequency rates
rather than absolute event numbers as part of the risk/benefit
analysis. Stakeholders have the same patient welfare and
risk/benefit considerations in the premarket approval stage as
they do postmarket approval. As such, the same policies should
exist.
Likewise, if one examines FDA’s mandatory recall
authority under 21 U.S.C. § 360h(a), it is apparent that
risk/benefit or probability concepts are an explicit part of the
statutory structure. FDA can mandate a notification to health
care providers if a device “presents an unreasonable risk of
substantial harm to the public health.”39 If FDA considers
event probability for FDA-mandated recalls, it should apply the
same concepts to the “voluntary” safety alerts performed by
industry.40 Again, using a simple number of events as the
37. 21 C.F.R. § 860.7(b)(3) (2005); see 21 U.S.C. § 360(e) (2000).
38. See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. § 860.7(d)(1); 21 C.F.R. § 814 (2005).
39. 21 U.S.C. § 360h(a) (2000).
40. While technically the recalls or safety alerts that are the subject of
this commentary are voluntary industry actions, there is substantial direct
and indirect FDA oversight and pressure. See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. §§ 7.40-.59
(2005); 21 C.F.R. § 806 (2005) (establishing procedures and obligations for
manufacturer initiated safety alerts). If a company fails to conduct a field
action, FDA has a variety of formal and informal remedies available to it,
including Form 483 observations. For example, one observation in a recent
Guidant Form FDA-483 was that Guidant’s quality system was deficient

HALL_COMMENTARY_FINAL_899.DOCINAL

2005]

A PROPOSED SOLUTION

01/09/2006 12:38:43 PM

203

trigger for a safety alert would result in an unjustifiable policy
inconsistency.
Similarly, physicians also make decisions based upon
probability or frequency rate-based risk/benefit assessment.
Without a frequency rate or probabilities, the physician and
patient cannot make any rational risk/benefit decision. For
these reasons, product safety alerts almost always include
frequency rates and probabilities.
Using just an arbitrary number of events as the trigger
creates a key gap. Sometimes the manufacturer can identify an
issue that has not actually caused a field malfunction but
rather increases the risk of a future malfunction. In that case,
there is no event against which to apply the trigger. Relying
only on actual events as the trigger ignores this crucial risk
prevention or mitigation function of the notification system.
Finally, there is no logical or policy basis to differentiate
one number from another. If we say notify whenever there are
ten events, why not nine or eleven?
A trigger based upon the raw number of events will not be
that helpful for physicians, patients, or policymakers. Here,
FDA and all other stakeholders need to take a stand that raw
event numbers are not an appropriate basis upon which to base
critical patient care decisions.
This approach is also
inconsistent with the risk/benefit and probability based criteria
for FDA-mandated notifications in 21 U.S.C. § 360h. While
this approach would give industry certainty, it does not
advance the needs of physicians and patients.
Option 3: Establish a Trigger Based on the Frequency or Rate
of Events
The next option is to define an objective trigger based upon
some frequency or event rate. For example, one could set a
trigger for a safety alert at a 1/5,000 or 1/1,000 event rate. This
approach addresses some of the key weaknesses of Option 2
while still providing industry with certainty. It is more
consistent with other FDA policies. As such, it merits closer
scrutiny.
Several difficult issues exist with this option. First, what
because physicians had not been notified of several product issues. See FDA,
Form
FDA-483
(Sept.
1,
2005),
available
at
http://www.fda.gov/ora/frequent/483s/2124215_guidant/MINDOGuidantCorpF
D483_20050901.pdf.
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should the line be? The clinical relevance of a particular event
rate will vary among devices and among individual physicians.
As demonstrated by the presentation of Dr. Michael Barber,
there are significant differences in what event rate physicians
consider relevant for ICDs.41 The value of incident rates as a
tool for medical decisionmaking was likewise challenged at the
HRS Policy Conference. “[O]ne panelist noted that the rate of
incidents is meaningless unless put in the context of a specific
patient.”42 Dr. William Maisel’s work also establishes that
different physicians view the importance of certain levels of
malfunction probability very differently. “Physician consensus
exists regarding the management of some device advisories but
substantial differences of opinion are present regarding the
management of many others.”43 Some would act with risks of
1/10,000 while others would be comfortable up to a 1/100 risk.
The level of acceptable risk will also vary by device type.
Second, how should situations be handled in which the
trend in question is under the anticipated incident rate of the
device? For example, assume that the device in question has
an anticipated and labeled malfunction rate of 0.1%. The
actual performance rate is 0.07%, but the notification trigger is
0.05%. Would it benefit anyone to take the time and effort to
notify the physician that the device is performing as well or
better than anticipated? If we are consistent in our position
that physicians should be provided with new information, then
this approach falls short.
Moreover, notification about
clinically irrelevant events can also create unnecessary anxiety
among current patients and can adversely impact the
willingness of new patients to use devices.
One could modify this approach and use a frequency rate
as a trigger for only “new events.” This requires everyone to
agree to what is an “old” event and what is a “new” event.
Current product labeling is certainly of no help as it generally
does not describe component or process specific failure risk.
Rate-based triggers also ignore the cumulative impact of
multiple malfunctions and event severity. It is practically
impossible to create different trigger levels for different
combinations or types of adverse events. There are multiple
types of adverse events and often we are concerned with future

41. See Proceedings, supra note 1, at 12.
42. Proceedings, supra note 1, at 14.
43. Maisel, supra note 31, at 442.
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events for which there is either a large span of possible effects
or even unknown effects.
This approach also relies upon the accuracy of both past
event reporting and future anticipated malfunction event rates.
Everyone recognizes that underreporting is a real issue. Use of
a frequency-based trigger increases the reliance on the
robustness of a system everyone questions and on the accuracy
of future event rate projections.
In addition, as discussed earlier, there is no logical or
policy basis to differentiate one number from another. If we
say notify whenever the frequency is 0.1%, why not 0.09% or
0.11%? Appropriate risk and patient needs vary tremendously
between devices. This approach ignores this key fact. A
certain malfunction rate may be acceptable for a Class I or
Class II device, but may not be acceptable for an implantable
Class III device.
This approach is also inconsistent with the criteria for
FDA-mandated notifications under 21 U.S.C. § 360h. This
provision compels a broader analysis than simply rate. It
requires consideration of “unreasonable” risk and potential for
patient harm. These considerations are more complex than a
mere percentage.
While more enticing than the other options discussed
above, this option still fails to satisfy the need to provide the
physician with actionable information or “new” information. It
also lacks agreed clinical relevance and can discourage
additional use of device-based therapy.
Option 4: Provide Information Deemed Relevant to Patient
Care Decisions
This approach proposes a subjective standard—tell the
physician if it is important. It requires the manufacturer to
make a subjective medical judgment. As such, it fails to
provide certainty and forces the manufacturer into making
medical judgments.
There are multiple problems with this approach. First, as
with any subjective standard, there is the challenge of different
opinions and second-guessing.
Arguably, this is what
happened in the Prizm 2 situation. Guidant made the initial
assessment that notifying physicians of the Prizm 2 situation
was not appropriate or required. Others strongly disagreed.
Similarly, the lack of objective criteria or certainty would make
FDA and public oversight difficult.
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Some have expressed concern that vesting this decision in
the manufacturer creates an unavoidable conflict of interest.
At the same time, delegating this task to a private body such as
HRS or a physician committee raises a host of issues including
makeup of that body, oversight, and conflict of interest. It also
may be an impermissible delegation of a government function.44
FDA itself has historically avoided making such specific
medical judgments.
Overall, the approach lacks clarity and certainty and may
not provide physicians with information that is truly needed.
This proposal simply repackages many aspects of the current
system. A better solution is needed.
Option 5: Keep the Old System
Few, if any, advocate keeping the current system
unchanged.
The current system does not establish any
objective trigger45 and, for a variety of reasons, has not met
stakeholder needs. Under the current system, companies are to
“carry out their responsibility to protect the public health and
well-being from products that present a risk of injury or gross
deception or are otherwise deceptive”46 in making recall
decisions. One can argue that this is equivalent to the
subjective standard of Option 4. In order to add some certainty
and objectivity, most manufacturers have created their own
criteria for initiating a recall, often through the use of health
hazard evaluations (HHE).47 In many ways, this is similar to
the HHE concept used by FDA to evaluate industry-initiated
However, because each
recalls in the current system.48
manufacturer can have a separate HHE, there is no assurance
of uniformity. Companies that might “push the envelope” may
feel “rewarded” by having to conduct fewer safety alerts.
In addition, current FDA regulations generally link recalls
with violations of FDA requirements. “Recall is an effective

44. See United States v. An Article of Drug . . . Ova II, 414 F. Supp 660,
665 (D.N.J. 1975), aff’d without opinion, 535 F.2d. 1248 (3d Cir. 1976).
45. See Barry Meier, Implants with Flaws: Disclosure or Delay, N.Y.
TIMES, June 14, 2005, at C1 (“‘You have to make judgment calls, and there is
no hard-and-fast rule,’ said Dr. Susan Alert, the chief quality and regulatory
officer at Medtronic . . . . ‘Different companies might come out differently.’” ).
46. 21 C.F.R. § 7.40 (2005).
47. Manufacturers are expected to have a “written contingency plan for
use in initiating and effecting a recall.” 21 C.F.R. § 7.59 (2005).
48. See 21 C.F.R. § 7.41 (2005).
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method of removing or correcting consumer products that are
in violation of laws administered by the Food and Drug
Administration . . . .”49 There may well be situations in which
the product is not violative, but additional or new safety
information should be made available to physicians. Linking
safety alerts with violations of law confuses quality and
compliance and can create a strong disincentive against
initiating safety alerts.
Given the overwhelming dissatisfaction with the current
system and its lack of objective and meaningful criteria, it
seems clear that the existing system has not met the needs or
objectives of the stakeholders.
C. A NEW APPROACH: LINK THE NOTIFICATION TRIGGER TO THE
PRODUCT LABELING
Given these issues with current approaches, the challenge
is to identify a realistic alternative approach that satisfies the
various stakeholder objectives. This commentary now offers
such a proposal for consideration. The basic concept is to link
the approval process, product labeling,50 and event reporting
systems with the product notification process. This proposal
also differentiates quality improvements from non-compliance
or a failure to meet product specifications.
1. Overview
The core of this proposal is to include in the product
labeling the total “all cause” predicted malfunction rate for the
specific device.51 Actual device performance, including both
actual and predicted malfunctions, would be compared to that
labeled rate throughout the life of the product. In this context,
actual device performance rates would include both actual
failures and anticipated or predicted failures. If at any point
the actual malfunction rate is higher than the predicted
malfunction rate, then a product safety alert would be
49. 21 CFR § 7.40(a); see also FDA, Guidance for Industry: Product
Recalls,
Including
Removals
and
Corrections,
http://www.fda.gov/ora/compliance_ref/recalls/ggp_recall.htm (last updated
Nov. 3, 2003).
50. This commentary uses the term “labeling” in the broad sense as
defined in 21 U.S.C § 321(m) (2000). Thus labeling includes the physician’s
manual or instructions for use for the device. See id.
51. See Proceedings, supra note 1, at 14 (“One of the things I’d like to see .
. . is what the expected failure rate should be.”).

HALL_COMMENTARY_FINAL_899.DOC

208

MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH.

01/09/2006 12:38:43 PM

[Vol. 7:1

required.52 This approach uses the actual product labeling for
each product as the unique, device-specific trigger for product
safety alerts.53
There is also a recognized need to periodically update the
physician and patient about the performance of an already
implanted device even if it is performing as specified.54 To
address this need, the physician’s manual or a product
performance report would be periodically updated with
information about device performance even in situations in
which the device was performing better than the total predicted
malfunction rate. Whether one uses the annual report process
as the jurisdictional basis or an obligation to update the
labeling as a condition of approval, the result is the same.55
The physician would have access to new information and a
periodic performance affirmation.
This approach also differentiates compliance and quality.
Compliance sets minimum standards, in this case a
malfunction rate. Compliance is binary. One is either in
compliance or out of compliance. Quality, on the other hand, is
aspirational. Quality can and should always be improved. The
failure to meet the labeled malfunction specification is a
compliance issue. Acting to improve device safety or efficacy
when the device is already meeting labeled requirements is
quality improvement.
2. Implementation
The first step in this process is for manufacturers to
include the total anticipated malfunction rate in the product
labeling. This would be an “all cause” predicted malfunction
rate. This rate would be reviewed and approved by FDA as a
required part of the device labeling before product approval and
marketing.
In addition to its use for product safety alert purposes, the

52. There may be a degree of uncertainty about a predicted malfunction
rate given incomplete information. If the predicted rate range straddles the
trigger point, at least the product performance report can be updated pending
more information and certainty.
53. Any unique requirements such as the notification requirements for
certain electronic products would remain applicable. See 21 C.F.R. § 1003
(2005).
54. See Salberg, supra note 3.
55. See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. § 814 (2005) (providing additional information on
the labeling and annual report requirements).
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malfunction rate has the additional benefit of providing the
physician with key information at the time of the implant. As
discussed by several commentators, the total predicted
malfunction rate should be a vital part of the risk/benefit
analysis and product selection at the time of implant.56
This approach also allows FDA and physicians to compare
device performance across time, manufacturer, and feature
sets.57 Because all companies would have to include an overall
malfunction rate in their product labeling, quality and
reliability would truly become transparent and a basis for
competition.
Under this approach, the labeled malfunction rate becomes
the trigger for safety alerts. As long as the device is performing
at a level equal to or better than the labeled rate, the initial
positive risk benefit conclusion remains valid and the device is
performing as expected. So, for example, if a product has an
expected malfunction rate of 0.5% and the actual malfunction
rate is 0.2%, the physician and patient should be satisfied with
the original risk benefit analysis and decision. No product
safety alert would be required unless and until the malfunction
rate exceeds 0.5%.
One key advantage to this approach is that it takes into
account the overall performance of the device, not just one
trend. Under this approach, a product alert can be triggered by
one event that exceeds the labeled rate. However, unlike the
other approaches, a product alert can also be triggered by the
aggregate impact of multiple trends. For example, a number of
small issues might, in aggregate, exceed the expected “all
cause” malfunction rate when no one issue separately would do
so. The initial implant decision is based on aggregate device
reliability. If that level is exceeded, the physician should be
notified.
One could challenge this approach for failing to
differentiate between types of malfunctions or their
implications. However, this approach offers the flexibility to
deal with such differences. If the manufacturer or FDA
believes that it would be useful to include a more detailed

56. See Hauser & Maron, supra note 16, at 2042; Proceedings, supra note
1, at 20, 25.
57. Commentators have urged that quality become a marketing tool. See
Maisel, supra note 33, at 956 (“Public reporting would make safety a market
force.”).
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breakdown by malfunction type or patient impact, then that
information can simply be included in the labeling along with
the total predicted malfunction rate. A safety alert would then
be required whenever (a) the total malfunction rate was
exceeded, or (b) a more specific malfunction rate was exceeded.
This allows labeling flexibility based upon the specific risks,
characteristics, and usage of different devices.
One might also object to this approach because of
weaknesses in event reporting systems. However, using total
projected reliability as the trigger, actual event reporting
variations should have minimal impact.58 The methodology
used to predict performance when the product is developed and
approved should be the same methodology used to update the
predicted malfunction rate. As such, data reporting variability
should be neutralized. This approach also focuses on trends,
not single events.
Actual performance from the MAUDE database, registries,
or other information sources would be available as both an
input into the predicted malfunction rate and as a public check
on actual performance and accuracy of the predictions.
Furthermore, FDA routinely inspects the manufacturer’s
systems that are the input into the predicted performance
rates, resulting in a built-in check on company performance.
Including a total anticipated malfunction rate in product
labeling is well within FDA’s authority. FDA can require
companies to include that overall malfunction rate in PMA and
Supplemental Premarket Approval (SPMA) submissions and to
include that rate in the product labeling.59 Of course, similar
methodologies are needed for cross-company comparisons. If
there are not already acceptable industry standards, FDA can
develop guidance documents (with stakeholder input) to
establish a common methodology for various device classes.
FDA’s approval and inspection processes should ensure
consistent application of these standards.
The final question is whether this concept is consistent
with FDA’s mandatory notification powers. It is. Devices are
58. Any impact of low reporting rates also applies to other suggested
approaches. For example, using a raw number of events or an actual
frequency rate as the trigger depends upon robust reporting.
Here,
engineering analysis can be used to calculate the predicted failure rate and
thus compensate for any low reporting issues.
59. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 814.20, 814.39 (2005); 21 C.F.R. § 860.7(b), (d)
(2005).
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approved and labeled to reflect a risk/benefit balance.60 Using
the labeled predicted malfunction rate as the trigger
incorporates this risk/benefit consideration and is consistent
with the risk based criteria in 21 U.S.C. § 360h.
3. This Concept Works for All Factual Situations
Once the total projected malfunction rate has been
established, any malfunction trend falls logically into one of
four categories.
A detailed review of each category
demonstrates that this approach satisfies the various
stakeholder objectives and can be reasonably implemented.
a. Group 1
In this first category, the malfunction trend in question is
known and by itself or in combination with all other
malfunctions is within the labeled predicted malfunction rate.
In this case, the devices are performing as predicted and
intended. By definition, the performance of these devices is
equal to or better than the information used to make the initial
risk/benefit decision to implant the device.
There is no need for any safety alert as the physician has
had the necessary information since the time of implant and
has already been able to take it into account in making health
care recommendations to the patient. MDR reporting, failure
analysis, and trending would still be required, and individual
events would still be entered into the MAUDE database. This
level of reporting will satisfy the regulatory requirements and
ensure that there is adequate information for trending and
analysis.
These information sources also operate as a
confirmation of device performance. To the extent that an
individual physician wants to see individual events, that
information will be available from the MAUDE database.
Periodic product performance reports can reflect that the device
is performing as intended.
This approach is aligned with the product approval and
labeling processes. It promotes transparency, and it ensures
that physicians will not receive redundant or unnecessary
communications and current and future patients are not
unnecessarily alarmed. Finally, it is consistent with current
regulatory structures.
60. See 21 U.S.C. § 360e (2000); 21 C.F.R. pt. 814 (2005); 21 CFR § 860.7
(2005).
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b. Group 2
In this category, the malfunction rate by itself or in
combination with all other malfunction causes exceeds the
predicted and labeled rate. It does not matter whether the
particular problem was known or unknown. The patient is not
getting what the patient expected and what was represented to
the physician and FDA. This product may well be at least
technically adulterated or misbranded.61 The physician should
be notified of these events through a product safety alert.62 The
safety alert should describe the issue, its frequency, any
possible detection or mitigation steps, the new overall predicted
malfunction rate, and any other relevant information. Once
publicly available, the new malfunction rate then would become
the new standard against which any future device issues get
measured.
In one sense, the predicted malfunction rate can be viewed
as analogous to a contractual warranty. The warranty provides
that the device will not malfunction for whatever reason at
more that a specified rate. If the device is malfunctioning at a
higher rate than “warranted,” the physician is notified.
This approach provides the physician with new patient
care or risk/benefit information. It promotes transparency and
should help build or restore trust in the system. It provides
FDA with updated information and the opportunity to assess
any issue or set of issues on an ongoing basis. Finally, it gives
industry and other stakeholders certainty.
c. Group 3:
In the third category, a new event or trend is discovered
and the overall malfunction frequency rate or severity from all
causes, including the new event, is less than or equal to the
predicted malfunction rate. The labeling already correctly
identifies the failure rate and includes any relevant
malfunction detection or mitigation information.63 As such, the
current product labeling informs the physician of all necessary
and appropriate information. Given the continuing accuracy of
the labeling, nothing new needs to be communicated to the
61. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 351, 352 (2000).
62. Generally speaking, the requirements of 21 C.F.R. §§ 7.40-.59 and 21
C.F.R. pt. 806 would be applicable to this situation.
63. For our purposes, mitigation includes decreasing either the risk or
severity of the event.
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physician for patient care purposes. No safety alert is required.
Nothing more should be required from a compliance
perspective.
However, quality, trust, and transparency goals encourage
more communication. Patients live with these devices and so
have an ongoing desire for information.64 As such, information
about these trends, even though arguably offering nothing new
for patient care, can easily be made available to physicians via
Internet-based product performance reports or publicly
available physician manuals. This update can also include an
affirmation that the existing predicted malfunction rate
remains correct. Throughout this process, the manufacturer’s
obligations for MDR reporting, event analysis, and trending
would remain.
New information of this type should not be considered by
the agency or the public as evidence of non-compliance. As is
the situation today, updates to product performance reports
should not be treated as labeling changes subject to FDA
review and approval.65 To do so would build delays into
informing the physician, burden FDA, and convert quality
initiatives into compliance matters. Since the device is still
performing better than labeled or warranted, this is a quality
initiative. Manufacturers should not be punished, penalized, or
criticized for quality initiatives.
d. Group 4
The fourth and final group includes device issues (old or
new) which occur at a rate less than the labeled malfunction
rate but for which additional detection or mitigation
information now exists. Detection or mitigation information in
this context means information that is different from what is
already publicly available to the physician and that would
enhance the physician’s ability to selectively detect this
particular malfunction or to reduce or eliminate the potential
health impact of the malfunction.
This group presents a more complex situation. From one
perspective, the device is continuing to satisfy the product
labeling, including its specified malfunction rate.
The

64. See Bartels, supra note 3, at 184-85; Salberg, supra note 3.
65. One detail to be addressed upon implementation of this concept is
whether any provisions of 21 C.F.R. pt. 814 need to be modified to permit
changes to product performance reports without FDA review and approval.
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risk/benefit calculation that supported the initial implant
decision remains unchanged. Given that, the device may not be
considered legally adulterated or misbranded. However, the
fact remains that additional information can improve patient
outcomes or device performance. In this situation, the product
should be considered compliant, but the product quality can be
improved.
Quality improvement opportunities can exist
without the product being in violation of any FDA regulation.
If we mutate quality improvement opportunities into “recalls”
and non-compliance, we will discourage and penalize quality
improvements and risk misleading consumers about the nature
of the issue.
At the same time, we should not ignore this information.
From the patient and physician perspective, quality
considerations predominate, and the manufacturer should
make this new information available. The product performance
updates can be used to promptly communicate this information.
Again, such updates would involve established trends,66 not
random events. The only difference would be in timing. Rather
than waiting for an annual update or revision to a product
performance report, the update would take place promptly.
The dividing line between a product performance update and a
product safety alert is whether the product is performing as
well or better than its specifications. This is the difference
between a quality improvement and violative product.
Reserving the safety alert process for situations involving
risks greater than those set forth in the labeling enhances
communication clarity, avoids diluting the impact of actual
safety alerts, reduces inappropriate patient reaction, provides a
consistent linkage between the product labeling and the
original risk/benefit calculation, and does not inappropriately
discourage use of lifesaving therapy.
So, is there precedent or support for this approach? First,
issuing safety alerts for products out of specification that pose
some patient health risk is consistent with current FDA
practice.67 The proposed total predicted malfunction rate is
simply another device specification.
Second, the product
performance reports are essentially equivalent to how medical
information, apart from drug or device issues, is already

66. The definition of a “trend” should be device-specific, part of the
Quality System of the manufacturer, and subject to FDA review.
67. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 7.40-.59 (2005).
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communicated to physicians. The physician currently has the
duty to keep abreast of developments in his or her field. This
continuing education process relies on physicians reading the
medical literature and attending medical meetings.
For
example, if one physician learns of a better way to perform a
particular
surgical
technique,
that
information
is
communicated through medical literature and medical
meetings.
This approach to device quality improvement
information uses the same communication process. If it is
acceptable and usable for physicians in the surgical technique
situation, it should work here.
If we incorporate an overall malfunction rate in the
product labeling and use that rate as the notification trigger,
then defining what constitutes a malfunction is critical. First,
the labeled malfunction rate should include anticipated or
potential malfunctions, not just the rate of past events. The
risk being assessed by the physician and the patient is the risk
of a future event, not just what has already happened. Second,
as discussed earlier, it should use the MDR definition of deaths,
serious injuries, or malfunctions.68 This approach allows
comparison of data across systems and provides an overall
quality indicator for the consumer. The traditional adverse
event descriptions, warning, and contraindications in the
product labeling would remain. This concept simply adds new
information, namely the overall “all cause” predicted
malfunction rate as well as any subsets deemed appropriate, to
the labeling.
4. Various Regulatory and Market Forces Should Drive
Manufacturers to Be Accurate in Calculating the Total
Predicted Malfunction Rate
Any new regulatory approach should be reviewed with a
cynical eye. Is there a way to “game” this new system? Here,
the initial predicted malfunction rate in the labeling is the key
trigger point. So, would a company seek to game the system
and simply publish a high malfunction rate and thus minimize
or eliminate the risk of formal product recalls?
Two mechanisms should prevent this. The first is the
marketplace. Every competitor will also be publishing overall
malfunction rates. In this environment, reliability becomes a
basis of competition. Companies with lower malfunction rates
68. See 21 C.F.R. § 803.3 (2005).
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should garner a competitive advantage. Public awareness
would reinforce the market pressures. By making overall
malfunction rates transparent and comparable, we use market
forces to drive higher reliability and prevent “sandbagging.”
The second check on artificially high malfunction rates is
the FDA itself. By making overall malfunction rates part of the
submission and approval process, FDA will be able to consider
that rate in device approval decisions. FDA certainly should
question a manufacturer’s submission if there is any significant
increase in malfunction rates over previous generations or over
competitor’s products. FDA’s inspection process, including prePMA inspections, can also review the accuracy of the
manufacturer’s predicted malfunction rate.
Of course, this then raises the opposite issue. Will
companies seek to publish excessively low malfunction rates as
a way to gain a competitive edge? Several control mechanisms
should prevent such actions. First, if the labeling understates
the actual malfunction rate, the product could be considered
adulterated or misbranded.69 As such, shipments of those
products expose the company and individuals to significant
enforcement actions.70 During inspections, FDA can easily
compare complaint and MDR information against stated failure
rates to assess compliance. FDA also has access to information
from sources other than the manufacturer, including the MDR
and MAUDE databases, published medical literature, and
active surveillance systems such as MedSun. Second, if one
understates the malfunction rate, one is then exposed to
additional formal product safety alerts and relabeling
requirements.
Pressures to game the system in either direction are
negated or balanced by market dynamics and the regulatory
system. Here, market forces and regulatory requirements are
aligned to drive accuracy and compliance. Consumers will now
be able to compare real safety alert rates and respond in the
marketplace. As a result, manufacturers have every incentive
to make labeled malfunction rates as accurate as possible.

69. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 331, 351, 352 (2000).
70. See United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1975) (reaffirming criminal
liability for corporate executives even in the absence of intent); see also 21
U.S.C. §§ 332-34 (2000) (describing FDA enforcement options).
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5. The System Must Address the Distribution of Other NonCompliant Devices
To date, the entire discussion has revolved around
determining the criteria for triggering a product safety alert
related to patient safety. For the sake of completeness, we
must address product issues that do not involve safety or
efficacy issues.
First, there are products which do not meet specifications
or are otherwise non-compliant but present no safety or efficacy
concerns. These products may be considered “technically”
adulterated. The question is whether a product safety alert
should be initiated for these product issues. Given the need to
both avoid unnecessary consumer concern and to ensure that
the importance of safety alerts are not diluted, it seems clear
that it would not be appropriate to use the safety alert
mechanisms discussed above.
“Safety Alerts” should be
reserved for safety issues.
FDA has access to a number of enforcement tools to
address these issues. These can range from inspections and
“483” observations to seizures and criminal prosecution.71 Use
of these processes rather than safety alerts preserves the
integrity of the safety alert system while giving FDA its full
panoply of enforcement tools. Under these circumstances, if
FDA wants to pull products from the distribution chain, it can
use its seizure powers.72
There are some circumstances in which devices are being
marketed or distributed without FDA approval. Because these
products have not gone through the safety review process
under the PMA regulations or the investigational device
exemption (IDE) regulations,73 it is difficult to determine
whether these devices pose a health risk. In this situation,
logic dictates that safety alerts and actual product recalls may
well be appropriate in addition to the usual enforcement
mechanisms.
71. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. §§ 332-34 (establishing injunctive relief, penalties,
and seizure as possible enforcement options).
72. FDA can also use its enforcement powers in addition to a safety alert
in instances involving a violative product that presents a risk to health. For
example, the seizure provisions specifically cover products that are “dangerous
to health.” 21 U.S.C. § 334(a)(1)(B).
73. See 21 C.F.R. pt. 814 (2005) (establishing premarket approval
requirements); 21 C.F.R. § 860.7 (2005); 21 C.F.R. pt. 812 (2005) (outlining
IDE requirements).
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D. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATION
The proposed approach to health-based product issues can
be visualized as follows:

Product
Performance

Complaint
Handling
Obligations
Update to
Physicians
Manual
Product
Performance
Report
Update
Product
Safety Alert
Actual
Physical
Recall

Group 1
Performance
better than
labeling

Group 2
Events
exceed
predictions

Yes

Group 3
New event;
performance
better than
labeling;
no mitigation
Yes

Group 4
New event;
performance
better than
labeling;
no mitigation
Yes

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

Reconfirmed
at next
publication

Yes

Updated at
next
publication

No

Yes

No

Yes, prompt
product
performance
update
No

No

Yes, if
needed to
protect
patients

No

Yes, if
needed to
protect
patients

Few changes need to be made in either the regulatory
systems or current manufacturer or physician practices in
order to implement this new approach. This approach is
consistent with current regulatory processes including device
reporting and surveillance requirements under 21 U.S.C. § 360i
and 21 C.F.R. part 821 and FDA’s mandatory recall rights
under 21 U.S.C. § 360l. FDA already has the authority to
consider device reliability, including total malfunction rates.74
As such, only the following general actions would be needed to
implement this proposal:
 Product labeling (including physician manuals)

74. See 21 C.F.R. § 860.7(b)(4) (specifically stating that in considering the
safety and efficacy of a PMA device, FDA will consider “[t]he reliability of the
device”).
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must include an overall malfunction rate. This
rate can be added to current product labeling
either over a defined time or when the next
labeling update occurs.
 The regulations need to provide for mandatory
safety alerts when the total malfunction rate
(including known and new events) exceeds the
labeled rate. This could require amending certain
provisions in 21 C.F.R. §§ 7.40-.59 and 21 C.F.R.
part 806.
 Product performance reports would be used to
provide the physician access to any additional or
new information about trends within the
anticipated failure rate. These can be required
either by regulation or via the Conditions of
Approval for a PMA device.
This approach satisfies the stakeholder objectives and
links the various parts of the device regulatory system
together. It protects public health, maintains the role of the
physician, enhances trust, uses the regulatory system, and
provides certainty. It also differentiates compliance issues
from quality improvement initiatives. The required updates to
the product performance report ensure transparency and
provide access to quality improvement information. Anyone
can follow up on the new information as desired.
This approach also satisfies the criteria for an effective
trigger. It is objective and clinically relevant as it is based on a
device-specific safety and efficacy analysis. It is not only
consistent with FDA’s current statutory and regulatory
system,75 but it actually goes further and links many key parts
of the device regulatory process. Finally, it is applicable to all
devices and results in a uniform system with device-specific
triggers.
Making this information public does carry with it some
risk. Safety alerts must be made public in order to protect
public health. There is the risk of patient overreaction or
adverse psychological impacts when the product is performing
as well or better than predicted. By making information on
these products available in the product performance report, we
are minimizing the risk and making a conscious policy decision
75. As discussed above, this approach is entirely consistent with FDA’s
risk-based notification criteria in 21 USC § 360h.
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that the value of the information in that form, even if not
actionable, outweighs the risk.
VI. A PLEA FOR PREEMPTION
Assuming that FDA does indeed establish a trigger
mechanism—as it is encouraged the agency does—that trigger
must be national and uniform in application. This requires
preemption.
Patient and physician needs are identical from Maine to
California. Having different explicit or implicit trigger points is
simply unworkable. It is medically, ethically, and politically
impossible to defend notifying patients and physicians in one
state and not another. Modern communication systems such as
email, blogs, and message boards result in any safety alert
being at least national in scope. In addition, companies post
product information and safety alerts on websites and issue
press releases due to SEC considerations and FDA issues such
as Class I recalls. Safety alerts follow products across state
lines. As such, safety alerts have an unavoidable national
scope. Therefore, the rules determining when there should be a
safety alert must be national in scope as well.
One can create a de facto trigger through legal channels
other than FDA. Private class actions based on a failure to
notify physicians or patients of a product malfunction trend or
state actions based on similar grounds will create trigger or
notification requirements that are inconsistent with FDA and
potentially inconsistent among the states. This is not an idle
concern. For example, at the time of this article, the New York
Attorney General has recently filed an action against Guidant
for failure to issue a safety alert or recall for Prizm 2.76
The obvious response to this preemption plea is that a
state may be permitted to establish different, non-conflicting
standards. Here, however, any rule that sets a different
standard than FDA’s is conflicting. The notification trigger
actually makes two policy decisions. The first decision is when
a safety alert is needed. The second implicit but equally

76. See Press Release, Offices of New York State Attorney General Eliot
Spitzer, Medical Device Maker Sued for Hiding Defibrillator Defect (Nov. 3,
2005), www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2005/nov/nov03a_05.html. I offer no opinion
as to the legal or factual merits of this action. The point is simply that in the
future if a manufacturer has complied with the FDA trigger requirements,
such a state action would be inconsistent with established national policy.
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important policy decision is that in the defined circumstances,
a physician or patient notification not only is not required but
will have a negative impact on the consumer. It is this policy
decision that demands preemption.
If a state requires
notification in a situation in which FDA does not, that state is
overriding FDA’s determination that such a notification may
actually be inimical to the patients’ interests.
Once FDA establishes a trigger mechanism, compliance
with that trigger requirement must shield manufacturers from
different national, state, or private standards or requirements
for instituting product alerts. It is unfair and undercuts
national policy as expressed in the Food Drug and Cosmetic Act
for a manufacturer to be subjected to such inconsistent
requirements.
The legal authority for preemption exists; 21 U.S.C. § 360k
expressly provides for preemption for certain device
requirements. This provides that no state or other political
subdivision may have in effect any requirement: “1) which is
different from, or in addition to, any requirement applicable
under this Act to a device, and 2) which relates to the safety or
effectiveness of the device or to any other matter included in a
requirement applicable to a device under this Act.”77
Both required elements of § 360k are present.
As
discussed above, a different rule would be either “different from
or in addition to” FDA’s regulations, and the notification rules,
by definition, relate to safety.78 As such, FDA has the authority
to create a trigger that preempts any inconsistent public or
private trigger or any effort to penalize a company for
FDA must
complying with the FDA-mandated trigger.79
exercise this power to preempt once it determines the
appropriate trigger policy. Anything less eviscerates FDA’s
policy and its responsibilities.

77. 21 U.S.C. § 360k (2000).
78. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 360h (2000); 21 C.F.R. §§ 7.40-.59 (2005)
(establishing criteria for triggering a device notification).
79. Other legal theories or causes of action may still exist. For example,
there may well still be a standard product liability action for marketing an
allegedly defective product. The issues of preemption for these types of actions
are governed by cases such as Medtronic v.Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996), and
Kemp v. Medtronic, 231 F.3d 216 (6th Cir. 2001). A full analysis of
preemption issues including the issues surrounding preemption of product
liability suits in a Class III medical device context is outside the scope of this
commentary.
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VII. COMMUNICATION PROCESSES
Success always occurs in private and failure in full view.
- Anonymous
A. PHYSICIANS, NOT MANUFACTURERS SHOULD HAVE THE
RESPONSIBILITY TO COMMUNICATE SAFETY ALERTS TO PATIENTS
Historically, information about device malfunction issues
has gone from the manufacturer to the physician and then from
the physician to the patient. Several commentators have
suggested that the manufacturer communicate device
malfunction information directly to the patient in addition to
providing the information to the physician.80
There are several reasons why this concept is not prudent.
First, such a communication could interfere with the patientphysician relationship. Only the physician is in a position to
customize the general information to the specific needs and
desires of the individual patient. Multiple communications to
the same person about the same issue invites confusion,
particularly when dealing with issues and concepts as
necessarily complex as product safety alert information.81
This is not to say that patients are incapable of
understanding such information. The goal is to provide clear,
consistent information that is relevant to the specific
circumstances of that patient. The most effective method for
doing so focuses on the one source—the physician—who has the
relationship with the patient and understands the particular
needs of that person. The physician can answer specific
medical questions and make medical recommendations.
The manufacturer can be a resource for the physician and
should be willing to provide additional information at the
request of the physician. The manufacturer has a separate
obligation to ensure that the physician communication is clear
and accurate.
Before we mandate direct manufacturer to patient
communications, we must remember that some patients may
not want to have direct contact with the manufacturer or to
receive certain information. Given that it is impossible to
80. See, e.g., Maisel, supra note 33, at 957.
81. In essence, I assert that the criteria set forth in 21 U.S.C. § 360h(a)(2)
regarding notifications to physicians rather than patients have been satisfied
for safety alerts for products such as ICDs.
Exceptions for unusual
circumstances can always be made.
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determine in advance who has what preferences, the physician
must be the link to the patient.
B. TIMING
Many physicians want the opportunity to communicate to
the patient before the information becomes public. That is
probably an impossible goal. Often the manufacturer and FDA
will immediately issue a press release about the product issue
that echoes the content of the actual physician notification.
The actual physician communication is usually available on the
company or FDA website. Public disclosure of recalls also may
be required by SEC. Any press release will become public
before the physician has received the information and had an
opportunity to communicate with every patient.
In addition, email, message boards, and blogs speed
information around the globe. While we can debate the
accuracy or value of such communication tools, they are real.
As such, the patient may well have significant information
before the physician can contact the person. It is impossible to
control these various information sources until physicians can
communicate with each patient. This is the new reality of the
information age, and physicians must be prepared to reeducate
patients who have gotten questionable information from one of
these sources.
C. TERMINOLOGY
Multiple commentators have expressed concerns over the
lack of clarity in the current recall terminology. The most
common example is the use of the term “recall.”82 Whether
intended or not, this term communicates the actual, physical
removal of a product. In most recalls, this is simply not the
case. As a result, patients can be unnecessarily upset and
confused.
The term “safety alert” should be the universal term for a
physician notification of situations in which the device is not
meeting its labeling. This term is accurate and does not
mislead the lay public. The term “recall” would be included in
a safety alert if the recommendation is that the product
actually be physically removed from a patient. Otherwise the
term creates too much confusion and apprehension,

82. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 7.40-.59 (2005).
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particularly among patients.
The current “recall” classification system can work as long
as the definitions are used consistently. This requires an
accurate assessment of the risk and a consistent application of
risk analysis methodologies including the use of the actual
device risk. This is the total risk to the patient (risk of
malfunction multiplied by the risk of injury in the event of
malfunction) rather than the risk to the patient if the device
actually malfunctions.83 The latter approach is not consistent
with the actual classification language. More importantly, it
miscommunicates the real situation to the physician and
In order to accurately communicate risk, the
patient.84
classification system must consider both the risk of device
malfunction and the risk to the patient in the event that the
specific device malfunctions.
FDA must exercise discipline when making classification
decisions.
Objective criteria need to be established and
followed. Even if the issue involves an implantable device, if
the risk is less than the frequency requirements for a Class I
designation, so be it. “Overclassification” weakens the system,
unduly alarms patients, and results in true safety alerts
getting less attention than deserved.
Other terminology questions may also need to be addressed
once the overall system has been established.
D. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The communication process and dissemination of product
information has caused anxiety and confusion.
Risk
communication specialists could be a great help in crafting
accurate, understandable, and non-alarming messages. The
key objective is to communicate accurately and to avoid
unnecessary alarm.
The following conclusions or actions
should be considered:
 Product safety alerts should go to physicians, not
directly to patients.

83. This is a major difference. For example, a product may have a 1/5000
chance of malfunctioning, but if it does malfunction, there is a 1/10 risk of
patient harm. Historically, the risk of malfunction is the product of the two
elements, or a 1/50,000 risk in our example. If we look only at the second part
of the risk equation, the “risk” is 1/10.
84. A related issue is that many physicians are simply unaware of the
meaning of the various classifications. See Proceedings, supra note 1, at 12.

HALL_COMMENTARY_FINAL_899.DOCINAL

2005]

01/09/2006 12:38:43 PM

A PROPOSED SOLUTION

225

The physician is responsible to communicate with
the patient. Manufacturers and FDA should be
available to support that effort.
 Communication specialists should be enlisted to
help craft understandable and accurate messages.
 The system cannot ensure that physicians have a
chance to communicate with patients before
information becomes public.
 Terminology such as “recall” should be revised to
enhance clarity.
FDA’s recall classification system should be reviewed and
updated. FDA must apply those classifications in an objective,
consistent manner. In part this means that individual FDA
officials cannot allow personal views about the significance of
some event to affect the objective classification process.


VIII. CONCLUSION
A conclusion is the place where you got tired of thinking.
- Arthur Bloch
The key to this proposal is linking the product labeling to
the device malfunction notification system. An overall or
“total” malfunction rate provides the trigger point for
determining whether a physician notification is required.
Different devices can and should have different trigger points
based upon product reliability, risk, and usage. Once the
trigger point is exceeded, a prompt, complete, and
understandable safety alert must be sent to physicians.
Product performance reports provide the mechanism for
physician updates of product trends that do not exceed the
labeled performance specifications.
Is this approach perfect? Of course not. Any notification
policy requires policy tradeoffs. Any line is arbitrary. No
definition of “malfunction” is perfect. Industry compliance and
FDA oversight is always required. However, this approach
does link together various parts of the regulatory system. It
allows the trigger to be set in advance, in the public view, and
in a device-specific manner.
It also encourages quality
initiatives without branding such actions as examples of noncompliance.
The final test is to determine whether this proposal meets
the objectives set by our commentators. I believe that it does.
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Public health is protected because physicians are promptly
notified of important new information. The consumer gets
information whenever the product exceeds predicted and public
malfunction rates. This approach also reduces the dangers of
overnotification and therefore does not create unnecessary
anxiety among patients. It also does not discourage the
appropriate use of device therapies. There is transparency
because product labeling sets forth malfunction rates, safety
alerts are triggered whenever that rate is exceeded, and
product performance reports contain overall trends even if the
product overall is performing better than specified. The
approach is consistent with the current statutory and
regulatory systems, and the patient-physician relationship is
maintained. Finally, industry and all other stakeholders get
certainty.
Let the debate begin.

